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Abstract 
 
As part of a wider argument that history is essential to psychological understanding because 
of the reflexive nature of psychological knowledge, this article examines the case of 
mesmerism in early Victorian Britain as an example of how psychological knowledge is both 
constructive and constructed. It is argued that the shift from ‘mesmerism’ to ‘hypnotism’ was 
a change in understanding that created a new kind of psychological experience. It is also 
argued that demonstrations of mesmerism, far from being self-evident facts, could be framed 
as evidence either for or against the central claims of mesmerism. It is concluded that the 
case of mesmerism in early Victorian Britain provides a further example of the need for 
historical understanding within Psychology. 
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The reflexive nature of psychological knowledge is, it could be argued, the central reason 
why historical understanding is necessary to Psychology (e.g. Graumann & Gergen, 1996; 
Richards, 2002; Smith, 2007). However valuable or interesting history might be, its necessity 
for psychological understanding follows from the nature of psychological knowledge. In 
short, psychological knowledge is the product of people thinking and acting in a certain way 
(i.e. doing Psychology) according to a particular time and place and, in the process, shaping 
Psychology’s subject matter in particular ways. What history shows is that, at different times 
and in different places, psychology has taken a variety of forms, and that in defining both 
what can be studied and how it should be studied, it has produced radically different versions 
of what we are (e.g. Danziger, 1990, 1997; Graumann & Gergen, 1996; Hacking, 1986, 
1995a; Kusch, 1999; Richards, 2002; Smith, 1997, 2005, 2007). It is, therefore, essential to 
psychological understanding that we are aware of how psychological knowledge comes to be 
what it is, and how that in turn shapes our understanding of ourselves. 
 
In discussing the reflexive nature of psychological knowledge, Smith (2007) has treated 
reflexivity as being concerned with two related points: first, since all knowledge claims rest 
on certain assumptions, there is no particular version of ourselves that is self-evidently true; 
second, since people are both subject and object of psychological knowledge, a change in one 
means a change in the other. This article considers these points in relation to a particular 
historical example of psychological knowledge, mesmerism. Mesmerism has been the subject 
of various historical studies, including histories of psychology. Traditionally treated as a 
‘pseudo-science’, it has more recently been shown to be an important precursor to subsequent 
psychological understanding, and an excellent arena in which to explore broader matters 
relating to psychological discourse and scientific authority (e.g. Crabtree, 1993; Darnton, 
1968; Ellenberger, 1970; Gauld, 1995; Lamont, in press; Leahey & Leahey, 1984; Quinn, 
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2007; Richards, 1992; Schmit, 2005; Winter, 1998). This article will consider mesmerism in 
early Victorian Britain as an example of how psychological knowledge has been both 
constructed by, and constructive of, people in particular contexts. Before doing so, however, 
it might be worth making some preliminary comments, based upon the work of, among 
others, Ian Hacking, Graham Richards and Roger Smith, relating to the reflexive nature of 
psychological knowledge and the implications of this for the role of history in psychology. 
 
 
Psychological knowledge and the role of history 
 
Psychological knowledge is both constructed and constructive. It is produced by people in 
particular ways within particular contexts, and it can change how people think, feel and 
behave. For example, it is the explicit purpose of much of clinical psychology as well as 
other areas of applied psychology, a purpose defined by people according to a particular 
social context, to change people through changing their knowledge and understanding of 
themselves. Indeed, the psychological knowledge that has been ‘applied’ over the decades 
has itself changed significantly, driven by changes in the wider historical context, and this 
has transformed psychologists’ own understandings and practices (which have, in turn, 
changed the manner in which their patients or clients have been changed as a result of such 
practices). In fairly straightforward ways, then, changes in psychological knowledge, shaped 
by particular historical contexts, have produced changes in psychological reality. 
 
However, psychological knowledge also plays a wider role in the construction of 
psychological reality. Psychology, after all, defines its subject matter. Psychologists decide 
what is of interest by identifying relevant psychological categories and ways of studying 
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them and, in doing so, shape how we understand ourselves. Thus, for example, when Watson 
defined Psychology as the study of behavior, he provided a radically different way of 
understanding what we are from that provided via introspective methods. It was argued, of 
course, that this understanding was too narrow and that we are, in fact, more than organisms 
who respond to stimuli. Both Watson’s approach and the arguments of his critics were 
themselves shaped by wider concerns about the status and relevance of Psychology as a 
discipline. Nevertheless, the success of the critics led to a significant change in how 
psychological research was carried out, and the new forms of psychological knowledge that 
followed, directed towards a quite different subject matter, defined us in a radically different 
way (i.e. primarily as cognitive beings). Since any given version of psychological knowledge 
provides a particular version of psychological reality, a change in the former will naturally 
result in a change in the latter. However, the reflexive argument suggests that this is not 
merely a matter of studying different aspects of ourselves; it suggests that a change in 
psychological knowledge changes not only our understanding but also, in the process, our 
own psychological reality (e.g. Hacking, 1986; Richards, 1992, 2002; Smith, 2005, 2007).  
 
In deciding what counts as psychological knowledge, psychologists not only define their 
subject matter but also, in doing so, define what we are as psychological beings. 
Psychological language, the categories, theories and metaphors that psychologists employ, 
define what we consist of and place the various components in a particular relationship. Thus, 
a change in psychological language amounts to a change in how we define what we are at a 
fundamental level. For example, whereas once we had passions and affections, now we have 
emotions, once we had character, now we have personality, and these psychological 
categories, though similar, are not the same thing (e.g. Danziger, 1997; Dixon, 2003; 
Richards, 2002; Smith, 2005). This, so far, might be seen as an epistemological argument, 
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about knowledge of ourselves rather than our ‘actual’ selves. However, since language is 
necessary for understanding – indeed, there is no meaningful experience without language - it 
is, in practice, impossible to distinguish between psychological reality and particular 
descriptions of it. This is not to say that there is nothing beyond language, but rather that, 
whatever it might be, we cannot say anything about it (or meaningfully experience it) without 
employing particular psychological language (e.g. Leary, 1994; Richards, 1992, 2002; Smith, 
2007). It is in the sense that a form of description is necessary in order for us to have a 
meaningful psychological experience, whatever the physiological reality, that our 
understanding of ourselves amounts to our psychological reality.  
 
There are, of course, some kinds of psychological phenomena for which this seems more 
obvious than others. For example, it is hard to imagine having a belief without possessing an 
adequate language to describe it, but no doubt easier to see memory as something that is 
independent of language. Nevertheless, it remains the case that we cannot make sense of any 
psychological phenomenon without some sort of description, and that whatever psychological 
phenomenon of which we attempt to make sense is defined by the language we use. The 
current psychological definition of memory (including, of course, its various kinds) is a 
particular form of description, based on a wider metaphor for psychological reality, and one 
that is not self-evident but rather the product of the computer age. Just as to treat memory as 
psychological (rather than, say, physical or social) is one option, so is the particular 
psychological version we have today, and it is clearly shaped by broader views about the 
nature of mind, current technology and so on (e.g. Collins, 2001; Danziger, 2008; Richards, 
2002). Whatever its correspondence to the reality of remembering, one could not think of 
one’s past experience in such terms until fairly recently (cf. Hacking, 1995a; Richards, 2002; 
Young, 1995). After all, no Victorian had a short term memory as far as they were concerned. 
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In hindsight, of course, one might say that they did but simply did not know it, and this would 
be accurate according to current psychological knowledge, but it would not be an accurate 
way of remembering the past.  
 
It is precisely this question of whether historians of psychology should attempt to understand 
their subject according to either current or contemporaneous knowledge that is at the heart of 
the presentist-historicist debate. There is, of course, no correct approach, but the choice is 
important both in terms of how we understand present knowledge and in terms of the place of 
history within the discipline of Psychology. Some of us wish to argue that history is essential 
to psychological understanding, and that this is because we (as psychologists) are constantly 
in the business of constructing and reconstructing how we understand ourselves (as people). 
Indeed, the strength of the former argument can be seen to depend upon the extent to which 
the latter can be said to be the case, for if we can show that psychological knowledge is both 
constructed and constructive in a deep sense, that it is both shaped by non-empirical criteria 
and affects its own subject matter in fundamental ways, then the need for historical 
understanding should be that much more obvious. As some of the historical studies cited 
above have provided empirical support for this argument by considering specific cases, so 
this article seeks to examine mesmerism in early Victorian Britain as an example of the 
constructed and constructive nature of psychological knowledge. 
 
 
Mesmerism and the constructive powers of psychological knowledge 
 
Knowledge relating to mesmerism can be seen to have transformed psychological phenomena 
in a number of ways. In the most obvious sense, application of such knowledge provided 
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striking illustrations of how significant changes in individual thoughts, feelings and 
behaviour could be brought about. Moreover, such demonstrations also affected the attitudes 
of the wider public. After all, they were not only displays of psychological change but were 
also illustrations of psychological traits deemed characteristic of certain social groups. In 
1840’s Britain, for example, demonstrations of power over the minds of various subjects 
could be treated as evidence of the inherent mental inferiority of women, children, the 
working class or the Irish (Winter, 1998). More generally, they were illustrations of the 
powers of the human mind, and changed how people thought about themselves. The wider 
influence of mesmerism was in how it shaped views about what the mind was and what it 
could do, particularly in its power to change people. As a precursor to psychotherapy and 
practical psychology, knowledge of mesmerism was knowledge of how to transform human 
beings in fundamental ways.  
 
Indeed, for all the disputes over the validity of mesmerism, that it involved some kind of 
psychological change was largely accepted. After all, the 1784 Paris Commission, in its 
dismissal of the theory of animal magnetism, had explained observable changes in the 
behaviour of subjects as the product of their imagination, and the English translation of the 
report had noted that this reframed mesmerism as a mental rather than a physical 
phenomenon (Richards, 1992, 287). Indeed, the imagination theory was one that James Braid 
sought to refute in the 1840’s. The disputes, however, were complicated by the variety of 
phenomena associated with mesmerism. On the one hand, Braid's medical contemporaries 
largely rejected mesmerism on the grounds that observable changes in behaviour were not the 
result of a trance state induced by a magnetic fluid, and that more extravagant phenomena, 
such as cures, insensibility to pain, and lucid somnambulism (clairvoyance) were simply not 
real. On the other hand, the variety of phenomena provoked a variety of interpretations, and 
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so however much the discourse was primarily one of accepting or rejecting mesmerism as a 
whole, there were many who, like Braid, accepted some phenomena but rejected such things 
as lucid somnambulism. 
 
Nevertheless, disputes over the validity of various mesmeric phenomena were regularly 
disputes over the mental condition of subjects. When subjects displayed overt changes in 
behaviour, medical critics maintained they were not in a trance state. When patients reported 
feeling no pain during surgery, critics maintained that their testimony was unreliable and that 
they did, in fact, feel pain. And when Harriet Martineau (the well-known writer) claimed in 
1844 that she had been cured by mesmeric treatment, critics dismissed her as hysterical 
(Winter, 1998). Such was their psychological reality according to orthodox scientific 
knowledge in early Victorian Britain, at precisely the time Braid first proposed his theory of 
neurypnology. As his theory gained acceptance, however, an alternative scientific view came 
to be established. According to this new scientific knowledge, the mental condition of 
subjects was quite different: subjects were in a trance state after all; surgical patients did not 
feel pain; and Harriet Martineau was no longer hysterical.  
 
Of course, such a change in understanding was neither immediate nor universal, and was only 
one of several changes in the theory and practice of those who came after Mesmer. Indeed, 
Braid’s historical significance may have been exaggerated, not least in those psychology 
textbooks that have presented him as the champion of science over pseudo-science. 
Nevertheless, Braid’s theory and the new terminology he employed, much of which has 
continued to be used, was an explicit attempt to distinguish between his view and previous 
ones (Braid, 1843). And it is clear that many of his contemporaries recognised his view as a 
distinct departure from that of both the mesmerists and the sceptics. On the one hand, he 
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provoked the hostility of both John Elliotson, founding editor of the Zoist, and Thomas 
Wakley, founding editor of the Lancet (Gauld, 1995, 287). On the other hand, some 
previously sceptical medics began to distinguish between animal magnetism and hypnotism, 
as the latter was seen to provide a more plausible theory according to contemporary medical 
thinking. As one letter to Medical Times put it, Braid had shown that ‘many of the marvels of 
mesmerism are capable of rational explanation’ (‘S’, 1844). 
 
The shift in thinking that Braid’s theory represented involved a change not only in how 
certain psychological phenomena were described and understood, but also in the experience 
of those being understood in this way. In one sense, to view these phenomena according to 
Braid’s theory was to observe a quite different psychological reality, and observations 
according to this new understanding would, of course, inform psychological theory and 
practice (which would, in turn, shape how others thought, felt and behaved in a variety of 
ways). However, as Hacking (e.g. 1995b) has argued, the interaction between psychological 
categories and the categorised leads not only to new categories and practices but also to new 
ways of being. What ‘hypnosis’ provided was not only a new way of understanding 
psychological phenomena that would shape new practices but was also a new way of being. 
After all, according to Braid, the mental state of his subjects was due neither to the will of 
another nor to their own imagination, but rather was the result of intense concentration of 
attention on their part. It required the consent of the subject, indeed it could easily be self-
induced, and did not require the person who ‘put’ them in the state to arouse them from it 
(Braid, 1843). The hypnotic experience itself, therefore, depended upon the subject 
understanding what was going on in a quite different way from someone who was being 
mesmerized. Indeed, William Gregory distinguished between the two processes in terms not 
only of the induction process, but also the character of the sleep produced and the kinds of 
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phenomena that might occur (Gregory, 1851). In short, the experience of the hypnotized 
subject was different from that of the mesmerized subject.  
 
Clearly, the hypnotic experience shared certain features with the experience of being 
mesmerized, but it was the same for neither facilitator nor subject. Hypnosis amounted to a 
new psychological reality, in the same sense that Multiple Personality Disorder and Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder shared certain features with, but were not the same as, previously 
understood psychological conditions, and which in turn produced not only new 
understandings but also different kinds of experience for those who were treated, and who 
understood their conditions, according to these categories rather than previously available 
ones (Hacking, 1995a; Young, 1995). In the same sense that ‘nobody prior to Freud had an 
Oedipus Complex, that nobody before Pavlov and Watson was ‘conditioned’ and that nobody 
before about 1914 had a ‘high IQ’’ (Richards, 2002), nobody prior to Braid was ‘hypnotised’. 
This new psychological concept made available a new way of talking about and 
understanding a kind of psychological experience, and without that concept one could not 
discuss, observe or even experience ‘hypnosis’. In hindsight, one might wish to say that 
mesmerised subjects were, in fact, hypnotised, but neither those subjects nor anyone 
observing or discussing them had that form of understanding available to them prior to Braid. 
There was, for those people, no such thing as hypnosis for anyone to discuss, observe or 
experience.  
 
Whether one accepts this fully may depend upon whether one chooses a historicist rather than 
a presentist view of history and, in doing so, declines to overrule the figures of the past on the 
basis that more recent knowledge is correct. But this choice, of course, depends on one’s 
view of the purpose of history. If one is in the business of identifying precursors to current 
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knowledge, a valuable endeavour in itself, then a presentist view is, in some sense at least, 
unavoidable. However, if one views the history of psychology as a means of understanding 
the nature of psychological knowledge, then a historicist view is essential. According to the 
former position, knowledge about ‘hypnosis’ can be seen as a new and better way of 
understanding a kind of psychological reality that already existed. According to the latter 
view, however, such a psychological reality could not meaningfully exist without an adequate 
language to describe it. Both of these are epistemological arguments in the sense that they 
refer to understanding of something that was, at a physiological level, fairly similar (though, 
since the processes of induction and arousal were different, could not have been identical). In 
the latter case, however, one is questioning whether a psychological reality can be said to 
exist without a means to describe it. To say that people were (essentially) hypnotised prior to 
the existence of a theory of hypnosis is to describe the past in a way that contemporaries 
could not have understood, and to do so on the basis that our current view is correct (for any 
historical period). To see mesmerized subjects as hypnotised subjects is to ignore both how 
people understood themselves, and the argument that their own psychological reality 
depended upon ways of thinking that were available to them.  
 
The practical significance of this is that it prevents us from fully taking on board particular 
and, some would argue, the most important lessons in the history of psychology, i.e. that 
psychological knowledge is always based upon certain assumptions at any given time, and 
that changes in knowledge of ourselves have changed us in significant ways. It has been 
argued here that when Victorians framed such experiences as hypnotic rather than mesmeric, 
this was more than a new way of understanding the same experience. Whatever the 
physiological reality, hypnosis was, in effect, a new kind of psychological reality, since one 
could not meaningfully experience what one had no way of understanding. The significant 
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point, of course, is not that they were right according to their own knowledge (any more than 
we are right according to present knowledge), but rather that we are always in the position of 
relying upon current understanding in order to make sense of psychological experience, and 
that there is no way to convey a distinction between our experiences and our understanding of 
them. 
 
Braid’s hypnosis, then, was a new form of psychological knowledge and practice that brought 
into being a new experience, that of being hypnotised, which was different from being 
mesmerized at least in terms of the process of induction and the subject’s understanding of 
the hypnotic state (and, if one accepts Gregory’s view, in terms of the character of the state 
itself). Braid’s theory, of course, was the result of observation and experiment with many 
subjects, but it was initially prompted by a public demonstration of mesmeric phenomena by 
an itinerant mesmerist (Gauld, 1995, 281). While countless others had witnessed similar 
demonstrations, the kernel of Braid’s new theory was based upon an alternative interpretation 
of observed behaviour.  In short, he saw the same facts in a different way. That such facts did 
not themselves necessitate a particular theory was not only the case in relatively mundane 
mesmeric demonstrations.  Indeed, as we shall see, the most controversial and challenging 
phenomena were also open to radically different interpretations. 
 
 
The construction of the facts of mesmerism 
 
The variety of phenomena associated with mesmerism could provoke a variety of 
explanations. While observable changes in behaviour could be attributed to the subject’s 
imagination, demonstrations of mesmeric analgesia or lucid somnambulism could not. When 
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one saw public lectures on mesmerism in early 1840’s Britain, many of which included 
demonstrations of insensibility to pain and clairvoyance, one had the choice of viewing these 
either as illustrations of the effect of a magnetic fluid upon the physiology of the subject or 
else as fraudulent. If a sceptical medic was challenged by an apparently genuine case of 
analgesia in a female subject, he might dismiss it as a case of hysteria, though this seems to 
have been little more than a way of avoiding concession to the reality of the phenomena (e.g. 
Anon, 1844a). Cases of ostensible clairvoyance, on the other hand, were more clear cut: 
either they were genuine or else they were the result of deliberate deception. The importance 
of framing such demonstrations as one or the other was fundamental to the debate about 
mesmerism, despite the variety of phenomena, since the ease with which all of them could be 
grouped together meant that the dispute about the validity of mesmerism was regularly a 
dispute about whether such demonstrations were real or fraudulent.  
 
The fundamental importance of such public demonstrations to the dispute over the validity of 
mesmerism was recognised at the time. On the one hand, demonstrations of mesmeric 
phenomena, like similar demonstrations of chemical phenomena (e.g. Morus, 2006), had 
significantly more power to convince than mere talk. For example, when John Elliotson 
compared lectures on phrenology with the then new demonstrations of phreno-mesmerism, 
he noted that, ‘where formerly one had been converted to the truth of phrenology, now, 
through mesmerism, one hundred were converted’ (Cooter, 1984, 150). On the other hand, 
their demonstrative power posed a particularly direct challenge to medical authority. 
Demonstrations of insensibility to pain were observable evidence that mesmerism worked as 
an analgesic, and displays of lucid somnambulism suggested that mesmerism might be used 
to diagnose illness. Both these claims were explicitly made by mesmeric lecturers, who also 
provided these services to the public. Indeed, even those medics who became interested in 
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mesmerism, in spite of initial scepticism, did so as a result of witnessing such demonstrations 
and by coming to the conclusion that observed facts demanded investigation in a way that 
reported facts did not (Cooter, 1984; Gauld, 1995; Winter, 1998). Throughout all of this, it 
was the ability to show rather than merely tell, to demonstrate facts that were observable to 
anyone, regardless of theoretical inclination, that both attracted interest and provoked 
hostility among scientists and the wider public. For both sides of the dispute, it was directly 
observable facts that would determine the outcome. 
 
Yet even in the early Victorian period, facts did not speak for themselves. Whatever the 
power of demonstration, any demonstration requires discursive work in order for it to be 
treated as a demonstration of something (e.g. Lamont, 2006; Potter, 1996). Thus, while 
proponents would claim that such demonstrations were facts, and critics would reject them as 
fraudulent, this was not simply the case of different sides citing different facts. Rather, each 
side could frame the same fact as evidence of either the reality or the fraudulent nature of 
mesmerism. Indeed, as we shall see, even demonstrations of the most controversial of 
mesmeric phenomena, clairvoyance, whether successful or not, could be framed as evidence 
either for or against the reality of mesmerism. In this sense, the dispute about mesmerism was 
not about the facts of observed phenomena but rather about how such demonstrations were 
discursively constructed as facts of one sort rather than another. By examining these 
arguments, we can see that mesmerism is also an exemplary case of how psychological 
observation is always based upon certain assumptions and, therefore, open to radically 
different interpretations. 
 
 
Framing a failed demonstration of mesmeric clairvoyance 
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One minor but revealing episode occurred in 1843, when W. H. Weekes, a surgeon from 
Kent (a county in the south east of England), claimed he had discovered a subject who could 
demonstrate lucid somnambulism. A sceptical medic, one Dr Smethurst, went to witness a 
demonstration in which the subject, a boy, was blindfolded then attempted to identify objects 
that were placed before him. According to Smethurst’s account (Smethurst, 1843), controls 
against fraud were inadequate, and the boy was able to peek beneath the blindfold. At one 
point, he recalled, ‘the delusion was unmasked, for I particularly noticed that everything to be 
distinguished by the boy was invariably placed before the light, just under his nose, so that he 
could not fail of seeing them in that position’ (p. 146). Smethurst interrupted the 
demonstration to suggest a more stringent test, at which point the boy became anxious and 
cried out in terror. Weekes then ended the demonstration, told Smethurst that he had ‘alarmed 
the boy by speaking’, which was contrary to the rules of the society, and announced that the 
meeting was dissolved. When Smethurst’s requests for a further test were not accepted, he 
‘then, without the slightest hesitation, denounced the boy [as] an impostor’ (p. 146). 
Smethurst’s conclusion, which was subsequently described in a letter to Medical Times, 
noted that mesmerism, ‘invariably, when properly investigated, terminated in an exposure of 
their nefarious and barefaced attempts to impose upon the credulity of the weak-minded’ (p. 
146). Thus, though Smethurst’s theory about how the boy was cheating amounted to no more 
than a suspicion (according to his own account), the failure to adopt more stringent controls 
was presented as proof that mesmerism was a fraud. 
 
Smethurst’s letter to Medical Times provoked a response from Weekes, who presented the 
events in a quite different manner (Weekes, 1843). Though he disputed certain details, he did 
not deny that the test in question had been a failure, but rather denied that this was evidence 
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of fraud. On the contrary, he presented the boy as an example of ‘a genuine and beautiful 
instance of clairvoyance or lucid somnambulism’ (p. 322). Weekes’ reframing of the incident 
as evidence of the reality of clairvoyance involved two key elements. First, it was presented 
as merely failure on this occasion by citing prior successful tests of a similar kind. The 
validity of these tests was, in turn, warranted by an appeal to the stringency of the conditions, 
the scientific expertise of others who had witnessed them, and to Weekes’ own experience of 
having been ‘upwards of thirty years disinterestedly engaged in promoting the objects of free 
and unprejudiced inquiry and scientific truth’ (p. 322). Second, this particular failure was 
attributed to Smethurst’s interruption, by noting that he ‘did not remain silent, agreeably to 
the conditions at starting’, and adding that had he remained silent, he would have seen 
experiments ‘which, I think, must have put aside the most inveterate of your doubts’. (p. 
322). By describing the incident as one failure among countless successful trials, and as the 
result of conditions that were known (by those who had studied the subject) to be 
unfavourable, Weekes’ account of the same incident was constructed as evidence for the 
reality of clairvoyance. 
 
A similar incident was reported a few months later, when the well known mesmerist, W. J. 
Vernon, gave a lecture at Southwark Literary Institution in south east London, and several 
members of the London Medical Society made a point of attending. As Vernon prepared to 
demonstrate clairvoyant reading with several young female subjects, a medical gentleman 
produced a ‘full face mask’ that was lined with black velvet, and ‘so contrived as to render 
vision impossible’. Vernon ‘at first objected to its use, as the mask would render the face 
very hot; the slit for the mouth was very small, and there would not be a sufficient degree of 
lucidity’. However, he agreed for it to be tried on several girls, and the result was that they 
‘were utterly unable to read’. Vernon explained the failure ‘by attributing it to want of 
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sufficient lucidity’. The failure was discussed a few days later at the London Medical 
Society, where one medic ‘looked upon these exhibitions as utter deceptions’ and another, 
who admitted to having attended deliberately in order to expose the deception, ‘considered 
Vernon to be a thorough impostor, and one who ought to be exposed.’ This discussion was 
also published in Medical Times, and was reprinted in other medical journals (Anon, 1844b). 
 
Like Weekes before him, Vernon wrote a letter to the journal, appealing to his right to reply 
to personal accusations of dishonesty (Vernon, 1844). Admitting that the experiments had 
indeed ended in failure, he asked: ‘is it sufficient to justify medical gentlemen in imputing to 
me a desire to impose upon the public? Is it not a notorious fact that scientific experiments, 
which are universally allowed to be true, often fail in consequence of attendant 
circumstance?’ (p. 94). He then, like Weekes, described several similar experiments that had 
been conducted previously, in which he stressed the stringency of conditions and the medical 
credentials of the witnesses, such that two medical gentlemen had declared ‘that clairvoyance 
is a fact they can no longer resist’, and another had gone from being ‘one of my strongest 
opponents’ to one who ‘expressed his firm conviction of the truth of clairvoyance’ (p. 95). 
Vernon also framed this particular failure as the result of conditions that he had expected to 
be unfavourable, pointing out that he had ‘stated at the time that the mask might so far 
interfere as to prevent the manifestation of the faculty, but did not object to the experiment 
being tried’ (p. 95). Thus, while critics might frame individual failures as exposures of the 
fallacy of mesmerism, proponents could reframe them as one among many successes, and as 
the expected outcomes of particular conditions that were expected to be unfavourable to the 
phenomena, thereby constructing an account of failure as evidence for the reality of the 
phenomena in general. 
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Indeed, the description of such phenomena as prone to failure in certain conditions would 
have made perfect sense to many. As Vernon himself argued, that certain experiments 
sometimes failed in certain conditions was quite compatible with scientific work. 
Furthermore, failure could actually reinforce the view that such phenomena were not the 
result of trickery. After all, the alternative explanation for feats of this sort was some form of 
collusion between mesmerist and subject, a method that logically would work every time. 
That this was the case was reinforced by contemporary performers of very similar 
demonstrations of blindfolded vision, who relied upon codes to communicate information 
and framed what they did as entertainment. These performers, who will be discussed below, 
were often reported as never failing. Whatever observers may have known about how such 
feats might be done, therefore, the occasional failure was something that did not fit with the 
attribution of trickery, and did not look like contemporary performances that were more 
generally assumed to be trickery. Thus, for some, failure could be seen as evidence that what 
they were watching was not a trick. For example, when one observer of a mesmeric 
clairvoyant reported that the subject failed on occasion, he stated that ‘[t]hose exceptions to 
his general accuracy were, however, to me proofs of the absence of all collusion (A Lover of 
Truth, 1844). Such an argument was by no means unique, and proponents of psychic 
phenomena would continue to argue that the occasional failures of mediums and psychic 
claimants demonstrated that they were not employing trickery (e.g. Lamont, 2006). 
 
 
Framing a successful demonstration of mesmeric clairvoyance 
 
As accounts of a failed demonstration could be constructed as evidence in favour of the 
reality of mesmerism, so could successful demonstrations be framed as evidence that the 
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phenomena were merely trickery. At the same time as the proponents of mesmeric 
clairvoyance were demonstrating the ability of subjects to see whilst blindfolded, others were 
entertaining the public with very similar performances. These performers were also 
blindfolded, and demonstrated the ability to see objects and read without normal vision. 
Furthermore, it was by no means self-evident that they were performing mere trickery. Louis 
M’Kean, for example, was billed as possessing a faculty that ‘has defied the research of all 
the Medical men, by whom he has been seen’ (Houdini, 1908, 212), and the Morning 
Chronicle noted that there ‘can be no doubt that the answers proceed from the boy. By what 
means he is enabled to give them is a mystery … If all these feats are genuine the lad is 
equally a prodigy for knowledge and discrimination’ (cited in Anon, 1831). A few years later, 
and at the same time that W. J. Vernon was claiming to demonstrate genuine clairvoyance, 
the ‘Mysterious Lady’ was performing very similar effects to Louis M’Kean, describing 
‘minutely objects which are placed in such a situation as to render it wholly out of her power 
to see any portion of them’ (Christopher, 1962, p. 63). Indeed, there is clear evidence that 
some spectators did indeed attribute her abilities to mesmerism (e.g. Lee, 1866, p. 122; Paris, 
1853, p. 435).  
 
Nevertheless, her performances were billed in the contemporary language of rational 
recreation, being ‘interesting, surprising and instructive’ (Christopher, 1962, p. 63), and the 
show included ‘some sleight of hand tricks, performed with dexterity, and was written up in 
the ‘Entertainments’ section of newspapers (‘Mysterious Lady’, 1845a). Indeed, she was 
sometimes advertised in direct competition to those who claimed to do it for real. In March, 
as Vernon was publicising his demonstrations of ‘Mesmerism and Clairvoyance’, the 
Mysterious Lady was advertising (on the same front page of the same newspaper) her 
performances, which threw ‘completely into the shade the wonders of Mesmerism and 
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Clairvoyance’ (‘Mysterious Lady’, 1845b). Furthermore, medical critics of mesmerism 
encouraged others to witness such performances on the grounds that they were just as 
impressive as the feats of mesmeric clairvoyants (An Enquirer, 1845) Thus, whilst such 
performances were not self-evidently trickery, and precious few seem to have been able to 
discover how they were done, they were nevertheless framed by both performers and medical 
critics of mesmerism as evidence that the real thing was not real at all. 
 
What is significant here is that so far as they were framed as evidence that mesmeric 
clairvoyance was fraudulent, this was not on the basis of observable evidence. Neither 
M’Kean nor the Mysterious Lady ever showed or explained how they could see whilst 
blindfolded, nor did they ever explicitly state that what they did was trickery. They may have 
framed what they did as entertainment, described it as superior to ‘the wonders of 
Mesmerism’, and been viewed by certain critics of mesmerism as demonstrable proof that 
such feats were the result of trickery, but it is clear that some observers at least were not at all 
clear on this point. Thus, successful demonstrations of feats very similar to those in which 
Vernon and other mesmerists engaged could be framed as proof either for or against the 
validity of mesmerism solely on the basis of how individuals interpreted what they observed. 
 
Another form of demonstration that not only resembled but also explicitly sought to duplicate 
the feats of mesmeric clairvoyance were those of the anti-mesmerists. J. Q. Rumball, for 
example, gave lectures on the fallacies of mesmerism that included demonstrations of 
mesmeric phenomena. Both the lectures and demonstrations were explicitly targeted at those 
given by W. J. Vernon and other mesmeric performers, often being held in the same venue 
shortly afterwards. In Bristol, he provided a demonstration of a boy being able to read whilst 
his eyes had been covered, claiming that this was identical to demonstrations of mesmeric 
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clairvoyance but that, in this case, it was done by trickery. ‘We were not present’ reported the 
Bristol Mercury, ‘but have been informed that the lecturer exhibited, by means of his pupils, 
all the phenomena said to attach to mesmerism, and which were avowedly effected by 
collusion, but the operation of which was beyond the discovery of his audience’ (‘Anti-
mesmerism’, 1845). The audience, not being provided with any explanation of how the feats 
were done, were simply expected to view the demonstrations as fraudulent because the 
demonstrator said so. Thus, what was clearly observable as a successful demonstration of 
mesmeric clairvoyance could equally be framed as evidence that mesmerism was a fallacy. 
 
What was the case for the most controversial of mesmeric phenomena was, of course, also 
the case for other phenomena. As noted above, observations of striking changes in behaviour, 
or of insensibility to pain, could be framed as evidence either for or against mesmerism as a 
whole, depending upon the viewpoint of the observer. In short, the facts did not speak for 
themselves, and demonstrations of mesmerism, like other demonstrations, could be framed in 
radically different ways. While the demonstrations were often discussed as a more direct and 
convincing form of evidence, the observable facts did not themselves support one view rather 
than another. Rather, it was the interpretations favoured by observers that determined 
whether they were evidence either for or against mesmerism.  
 
Precisely why individuals might favour one interpretation over another is, of course, another 
and somewhat complex matter, though certain points may be worth making. First, proponents 
of the phenomena, such as Vernon and Weeks, though they invariably claimed that they had 
begun as sceptics, were nevertheless (at the time of the demonstrations described) in the 
business of displaying the phenomena as genuine. Conversely, critics such as Smethurst and 
the members of the London Medical Society had gone out of their way to view the 
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demonstrations they saw as part of a sceptical enquiry into mesmerism. It is therefore easy to 
see their interpretations as following naturally from their assumptions prior to observation. 
Second, while it may have been neither self-evident nor explicitly stated that the 
demonstrations of M’Kean and the Mysterious Lady were a form of trickery, there were 
nevertheless contextual cues (such as venue, publicity material and the style of performance) 
that no doubt led the majority to this conclusion. And, in the case of Rumball’s duplications 
of mesmeric phenomena, there was the explicit assurance of the performer himself that this 
was the case, even if such assurances were not accepted by everyone (cf. Lamont, 2006). 
Third, that individuals could disagree about the meaning of observed mesmeric phenomena 
should not be so surprising. Disagreements among observers were part and parcel of the 
disputes over phrenology (e.g. Shapin, 1979) and spiritualism (e.g. Lamont, 2006), and 
scientific observations have continued to be open to radically different interpretations (e.g. 
Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). Indeed, what all of these disputes illustrate is that different 
accounts of observations can be consistent with the observed facts and yet support 
contradictory assumptions. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Psychological knowledge has both defined how we should understand ourselves, and been 
practically deployed with a view to changing people. The deployment and dissemination of 
psychological knowledge can be seen to have changed its subject matter not only in the sense 
that it has focussed on different aspects of ourselves but also in the sense that people’s 
thoughts, feelings and behaviour can be transformed by new knowledge and new 
experiences. There is another sense, however, in which it can be argued that changes in 
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psychological language have been changes in how we think about how we think, feel and 
behave, and this itself can be seen as a change in what we are as thinking, feeling and 
behaving beings. The shift from ‘mesmerism’ to ‘hypnotism’ was not simply a different way 
of describing the same psychological reality but rather was a new form of knowledge and 
practice that created a new kind of experience. It is, then, an illustrative case of the 
constructive nature of psychological knowledge in that it illustrates not only how the way in 
which we think about ourselves can shape how we think, feel and behave, but also how 
available psychological knowledge shapes our psychological reality. 
 
Psychological knowledge is not only constructive but also constructed. This is necessary 
because it is always based on certain assumptions. There are no self-evident facts about 
psychological phenomena, only evidence that requires discursive work for it to exist as 
evidence of something. What the history of mesmerism shows is that even the most directly 
observable facts were capable of being constructed as evidence either for or against the 
central claim that was being demonstrated. It might be argued, of course, that the 
demonstrations cited were public exhibitions rather than scientific experiments but this, too, 
was part of the construction process. Such demonstrations were invariably presented as 
scientific tests by either proponents or critics of mesmerism depending upon the 
circumstances. When they failed, mesmerists could attribute this to the lack of proper 
scientific conditions (such as inappropriate interference by narrow-minded sceptics), and 
critics could attribute this to the presence of proper scientific conditions (such as adequate 
controls). When they succeeded, mesmerists could attribute this to the presence of proper 
scientific conditions (such as calm and open-minded investigation) whilst critics could 
attribute this to the lack of proper scientific conditions (such as the lack of appropriate 
expertise and adequate controls) (Lamont, 2008). 
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Mesmerism, therefore, provides a clear reminder that changes in psychological knowledge 
can result in changes in psychological reality, and that psychological ‘facts’ are always based 
upon certain assumptions. It also illustrates how disputes over how to interpret the facts were 
bound up with wider moral and social concerns. After all, proponents presented the analgesic 
and diagnostic properties of mesmerism as a benefit to humankind, whilst critics presented its 
rejection as part of an ongoing fight against irrationality and the exploitation of the credulous 
(Lamont, in press). At the same time, proponents of mesmerism sought to challenge orthodox 
medical practices and promote more democratic knowledge, whilst senior representatives of 
the medical profession went out of their way to debunk not only the validity of mesmerism 
but also the expertise of its proponents (Winter, 1998). Such disputes over the validity of 
knowledge and expertise serve as a reminder that psychological knowledge and practices are 
by no means merely passively accepted but can be contested, and such contests can 
themselves lead to changes in subsequent knowledge and practice (e.g. Hacking, 1995b). 
 
That mesmerism has often been treated either as a pseudo-science or as an inherently flawed 
precursor to superior psychological knowledge is a reminder of the limits of a presentist 
approach to history. The disputes over mesmerism were not simply a process through which 
scientific knowledge overcame erroneous beliefs. Mesmeric demonstrations were always 
open to alternative interpretations, and the rejection of the validity of mesmerism was not a 
natural conclusion based upon observable evidence. Furthermore, many critics of 
mesmerism, like many critics of phrenology, based some of their theoretical criticisms on 
grounds that few psychologists today would accept as valid (e.g. Leahey & Leahey, 1984). 
Nor is it sufficient to see mesmerism as a case of a partial understanding giving way to a 
fuller understanding. After all, whilst it is easy to think that we know better now, what 
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hypnosis amounted to was an additional interpretation of the same ‘facts’, one that was itself 
disputed, and which has continued to be disputed ever since. 
 
Only by examining the topic in terms that contemporaries would have understood can we 
understand what amounted to their psychological reality. Only by doing so can we fully 
appreciate that our own psychological reality is similarly shaped by the terms that are 
currently available to us in this particular historical context, and which themselves are always 
disputable. Psychology might benefit from a history that stresses its achievements, and 
indulge a history that provides information of antiquarian interest, but it requires a history 
that critically examines how psychological knowledge has been constructed in particular 
ways and has, in the process, shaped the very subject matter it seeks to describe.  Only with 
the hindsight of historical knowledge can we see that, and in what ways, this has been the 
case.  
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